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INTRODUcTION
The idea of a free, open and well-developed securities market is
premised on the hypothesis that the competing judgments of buyers
and sellers regarding a security's fair price will drive market prices to
reflect, as much as possible, that security's just price.1 Investors who
buy and sell stock at market prices do so in reliance on the integrity
of that price. In fact, "'it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer
or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would know-
ingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?"' 3 Because of this reliance
on the integrity of market prices, when materially misleading state-
ments are disseminated into the market, such misleading information
affects the price of certain securities and, thereby, affects all those
who trade in those securities." In a Rule 10b-5 action, once a plaintiff
establishes there is liability for materially misleading statements that
affected the securities market, the issue of damages arises. Without
knowing the exact extent of an investor's reliance on a security's
price, or the exact extent misleading information affected a security's
price, it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty the
amount of damages caused. In general, damages in Rule lOb-5 cases
are measured as the "difference between the price [of the security]
under correct information and the actual market price."5
The practice of measuring damages in Rule 10b-5 suits came to
rely on the capital market theory known as the Efficient Capital Mar-
kets Hypothesis ("ECMH") long before the United States Supreme
Court's implied acceptance of it in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.6 The ECMH
holds that securities' prices adjust quickly and without bias to publicly
available information. Assuming that the ECMH is valid, it is but a
short step from the application of other capital market theories to the
calculation of damages in Rule lOb-5 suits.
The celebrated capital market theory that has been applied to the
measurement of damages in Rule 10b-Z suits is the market model,
which is an empirical derivation of the Capital Asset-Pricing Model
SeeBasic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (citation omitted).
2 See id.
3 Id. at 246-47 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
4 See id. at 247.
5 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
AcQuIsrrIONS 138 (Supp. 1993).
6 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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("CAPM") . The market model holds that a security's return is a lin-
ear function of a general market factor, where the general market fac-
tor serves as a proxy of economic conditions that influence returns to
securities in the capital market. The CAPM is an equilibrium asset-
pricing theory which posits that the sole variable that explains the dif-
ferences in expected returns for securities is a risk coefficient known
as beta (Pi). Beta is the ratio of the covariance of a security's return
and the market's return to the variance of the market's return, (ssm
S2m) .8 The CAPM asserts that the relationship between a security's
expected returns and beta is positive and linear.
This Article contends that, contrary to its present use in the secu-
rities fraud realm as sanctioned by the Supreme Court and as as-
sumed to be correct by most commentators, the CAPM is irrelevant
for measuring damages in Rule lOb-5 cases because the CAPM is not
designed to measure what stock prices would have been if the requi-
site fraud had not occurred. Instead, the CAPM is designed to help
investors and portfolio managers determine optimal asset portfolios.
That is, the CAPM is designed to help people make decisions about
assets with uncertain future returns, rather than to analyze the actual
past returns of assets in a manner that would allow for the measure-
ment of damages pursuant to Rule 10b-5.
This Article further asserts that the legal community should, in
the context of the measurement of damages in Rule lOb-5 cases, re-
ject the use of empirical derivations of the CAPM, and, in its place,
use more accurate models designed to analyze past asset perform-
ance. In attacking the very foundations of the present methodology
for calculating securities fraud damages, Part I of this Article reviews
Rule 10b-5 and the basic methodology of calculating damages in Rule
10b-5 cases. Part II examines the intersection of judicial theory and
capital market theory by considering the fraud-on-the-market doc-
trine and the capital market theories under which the doctrine and
the measurement of damages may be justified: the Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis, systematic risk compensation and the Capital As-
The CAPM was developed in the 1960s by a number of financial economists in
response to the groundbreaking work of Harry Markowitz regarding portfolio theory.
See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7J. FIN. 77 (1952). Most notable among the de-
velopers of the CAPM were Sharpe, Lintner and Mossin. SeeJohn Lintner, The Valua-
tion of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets,
47 REv. ECON. STAT. 13 (1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, 34
ECONOMETRIcA 768 (1966); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19J. FIN. 425 (1964).
8 This measure of risk is commonly referred to as "beta" (/3).
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set-Pricing Model. Part III contrasts the forward-looking basis of the
CAPM with the historical basis for Rule 1Ob-5 damages. As Part III il-
lustrates, whereas the CAPM approach calculates the historical rela-
tionship between stock price and the Standard & Poor's 500 Index
("S&P 500 Index" or "S&P 500") and then projects the relationship
forward to the period of the fraud, the technique we employ recog-
nizes that it is erroneous to discount or ignore other factors besides
movements in the S&P 500 Index that might actually have an even
more powerful causal impact on a relevant security's price. Part IV
introduces an alternative to the CAPM for damage measurement, util-
izing the principles of arbitrage pricing theory. Finally, Part V surveys
an empirical study that compares the ability of the CAPM with other
derivative methods to explain the returns of common stocks and also
introduces our own empirical study-one that is clearly superior to
the CAPM's derivatives for measuring Rule lob-5 damages.
I. RULE lOb-5 AND THE CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
A. Rule lOb-5 Overview
Rule 10b-5 is one of the most significant remedies for fraud pro-
vided under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 It is the primary
antifraud weapon against material misrepresentations or nondisclo-
sures by issuers, insider trading and corporate mismanagement in-
volving securities transactions. The Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC") promulgated Rule lOb-5 under the rulemaking authority
vested in it by Congress under § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Unchanged since its promulgation in 1942, Rule 10b-5 pro-
vides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
It is estimated that at least one-third of the actions brought under the federal
securities statutes involve Rule lOb-5. See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEwis D. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.5(6) (2d ed. 1993).
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.10
The text of Rule lOb-5 does not expressly provide a private right
of action. This absence of positive language detailing a private right
of action remains the root of pervasive uncertainty and ambiguity in
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. Nevertheless, courts have long held that
Rule lOb-5 implies a private right of action under which investors may
seek a remedy for injury independent of any enforcement action un-
dertaken by the SEC."
Despite recent decisions limiting the expansive reach of Rule
10b-5, '2 it remains the chief private remedy against fraud in the pur-
chase and sale of securities. As a threshold matter, establishing fed-
eral jurisdiction is usually not a problem. A plaintiff need only dem-
onstrate that the defendant conducted some aspect of the contested
securities transaction using an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce. Interstate telephone calls and interstate use of the mails cer-
tainly qualify; notably, intrastate telephone calls or use of the mails
qualify as well.'3 Moreover, a defendant cannot assert a lack of juris-
dictional means merely by arguing that the violative misrepresenta-
tion or omission was itself never transmitted using an instrumentality
of interstate commerce; any memorandum or telephone call trans-
mitted using an instrumentality of interstate commerce, preceding or
following the alleged violation, provides sufficient jurisdictional
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
11 See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court conclusively affirmed an implied cause of action
under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983).
12 See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (denying an im-
plied private right of action against aiders and abettors of securities law violations);
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (holding
that an action must be commenced within one year after discovering the facts consti-
tuting the violation and within three years of the violation); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that the alleged conduct must be "deceptive");
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that a defendant must act
with scienter, not merely negligence).
13 See, e.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1982); Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 642 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Ingraffia v.
Belle Meade Hosp. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1970). But cf Dennis v. General
Imaging, Inc., 918 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting, without holding, that an in-
trastate telephone call may not satisfy thejurisdictional "in commerce" requirement).
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means for the entire transaction. Importantly, however, face-to-face
conversations do not independently establish jurisdictional means.
The transactional scope of Rule 10b-5 is equally broad. Rule
10b-5 provides three sweeping and widely overlapping causes of ac-
tion. Each cause of action requires a plaintiff to sustain the burden of
proof for five substantive elements. First, clauses (a) and (c) of Rule
10b-5 require a showing of a fraud or deceit, while clause (b) requires
a showing of a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact. Next,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
or omission was perpetrated (2) by any person (3) in connection with
(4) the purchase or sale (5) of any security. Finally, the elements of
common law fraud overlay the five substantive elements of Rule
10b-5. Thus, a plaintiff must also establish materiality, reliance, cau-
sation and damages.
A plaintiff relying on clause (b), for example, must prove the exis-
tence of a misrepresentation or omission of fact by the defendant and
her reliance upon the defendant's misrepresentation or omission of
fact when making her investment decision. "Reliance" requires that
the misrepresentation constitute a substantial factor in the plaintiff's
investment decision. 4 The "purchase or sale" requirement likewise
demands that the plaintiff actually purchased or sold the securities
involving the alleged misrepresentation, omission, fraud or deceit.'5
In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the misrepresentation or
omission of fact was material, that the defendant intentionally or
recklessly made the misrepresentation or omission of fact, and that
the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's conduct. 6
"Materiality" requires that there be a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable investor would consider the disclosure of the omitted fact as
significant in making an investment decision. 7 Causation is estab-
lished by proving a sufficient causal connection between the injury
14 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 206; Lipton v. Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740,
742-43 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,
340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub onm., List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
15 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
16 See Ross v. Bank South, NA, 837 F.2d. 980, 991 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'ggranted,
885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in par
459 U.S. 375 (1983); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977).
17 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 534.
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suffered and the defendant's wrongful conduct. 8 Finally, the plaintiff
must quantify the alleged damages.
B. Calculation of Damages
1. The Out-of-Pocket Measure
The out-of-pocket measure has become a popular method of cal-
culating damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.' 9 The out-of-pocket measure
"fixes recovery as the difference between the purchase price and the
value of the security at the date of purchase less the difference be-
tween the sale price and the value of the security at the date of sale."
2 0
One simple explanation for calculating damages by the out-of-pocket
measure is expressed in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in the case
of Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.2' Judge Sneed, in a concurring
opinion, articulated that
[I]t becomes necessary to establish, for the period between the date of
the misrepresentations and the date of disclosure, data which when ar-
ranged on a chart will form, on the one hand, a "price line" and, on the
other, a "value line." The price line will reflect, among other things, the
effect of the corporate defendant's wrongful conduct. The establish-
ment of these two lines will enable each class member purchaser who
has not disposed of his stock prior to disclosure of the misrepresenta-
tions to compute his damages by simply subtracting the true value of his
stock on the date of his purchase from the price he paid therefor.2
Under the out-of-pocket procedure, as detailed by Judge Sneed, cal-
culating the value line is tantamount to calculating damages.
This conclusion is readily evident when viewed in graphic detail.
The procedure is depicted in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis rep-
resents time and the vertical axis represents the per unit price of the
security. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that the security
18 See Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81, 85-87 (2d Cir. 1988); First In-
terstate Bank of Nev. v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775, 779-80 (7th Cir. 1988).
19 See Bradford Cornell & R_ Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Dam-
ages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 885 (1990); see also Wool v. Tan-
dem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1987); Harris v. Union Elec.
Co., 787 F.2d 355, 367 (8th Cir. 1986); Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555-56; Blackie v. Bar-
rack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975); In reLTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 148, 148-49
(N.D. Tex. 1980); Arnold S.Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1093, 1099-1102 (1977).
Cornell & Morgan, supra note 19, at 885.
23 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
- Id. at 1344 (Sneed,J., concurring).
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prices represented in Figure 1 are that of the common stock of XYZ a
publicly held corporation whose shares are actively traded on a na-
tional exchange. Suppose further that XYZs CEO withholds informa-
tion from the public regarding XYZs research and development that
would be extremely depressing to the value of the firm, as repre-
sented by the price of its common stock, if the information became
public. Before the commencement of the misrepresentation by the
CEO, the price line and the value line of the XYZ common stock are
coincident. However, once the misrepresentation begins, the value
line, which represents the price the stock would assume absent the
misrepresentation, declines significantly. The price line, which rep-
resents the actual market price of the security, remains above the
value line for the duration of the time the misrepresentation is con-
ducted. Once the misrepresentation is disclosed, the price line and
the value line quickly return to coincidence. This result follows from
the assumption of the ECMH that the price of a risky asset in an effi-
cient market reflects information quickly and without bias.
FIGURE 1. PRICE LINE AND VALUE LINE
Commencement of Price LinePie Misrepresentation Dicouef
PrceMisrepresentationDilouef
Of Resumption of
Price and Value
Artificial Inflation Linesof Security Price
Valu Line
Time
For an investor who purchased shares of XYZ after commence-
ment of the misrepresentation and did not sell until after the correc-
tive disclosure, the measure of damages is the difference between the
price line-which represents how much the investor actually paid for
a share of XYZ-and the value line-which represents how much the
investor should have paid for a share of XYZ in the absence of the
misrepresentation. For an investor who purchased shares after com-
1997] SOLVING A FLA WIN FRA UD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY 1105
mencement of the misrepresentation, but who sold those shares be-
fore the corrective disclosure, the measure of damages is the differ-
ence between the price line and the value line at the time of purchase
and the price line and the value line at the time of sale. Note that,
where the difference between the price and value lines at the time of
sale equals or exceeds the difference at the time of purchase, the in-
vestor has not suffered a loss and therefore may not pursue a claim
for recovery of damages.
2. Determination of the Value Line
Determining the value line requires two steps: first, the corrective
disclosure date and the resulting disclosure price must be ascer-
tained; and, second, an appropriate model of asset pricing must be
used to calculate the prices comprising the value line for the period
commencing with the fraudulent conduct and ending with the cor-
rective disclosure.
a. Disclosure Date and Disclosure Price
Accurate identification of the disclosure date is necessary because
the value line is determined by moving backward in time from the
corrective disclosure date to the date of the fraudulent conduct. De-
termining the disclosure date, however, can prove problematic. In
most instances, the fraudulent conduct consists of a series of acts or
omissions that are later remedied by yet another series of acts or ad-
missions.2
The disclosure price is "the price at which the security would have
traded if the omitted and misrepresented information-and only that
information-were accurately disclosed at the start of the class pe-
riod." 2' Two steps are required to determine the disclosure price: (1)
a determination of the precise nature of the information that is the
subject of the fraudulent conduct; and (2) an estimation of the value
of that information-i.e., estimating the effect of that information on
the price of the security had the information been disclosed. Step
two is generally viewed as the more problematic step because "[i]n
order to calculate the equivalent disclosure price, one must estimate
See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1990). The parties
disputed the disclosure date, the type of disclosure that should have been made, and
the date on which the undisclosed information should have been disclosed in the first
instance.
24 Cornell & Morgan, supra note 19, at 894.
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how disclosure of the omitted or misrepresented information would
affect investor beliefs regarding the magnitude of future cash payouts
on the security and the likelihood of receiving those payments. "2
Unfortunately, capital market theory does not provide a quantitative
framework for the purpose of calculating investor assessments of in-
formation. It only offers a framework for determining the price of a
given security given the presumption of investor assessment of infor-
mation. Therefore, determining disclosure price is necessarily fact-
specific and obtainable only by inference.
b. Calculating the Value Line
There are two methods for calculating the value line that rely on
capital market theory: (1) the comparable index approach; and (2)
the event study approach. The comparable index approach relies on
asset-pricing models to calculate estimates of the returns the security
would have generated in the absence of the fraudulent conduct. The
event study approach treats corrective disclosures "as events and sub-
stitutes the predicted return on the event days"2 6 for those of the days
during the fraud. The event study approach therefore assumes that
the price and value lines will move in perfect correlation with each
other, albeit at different levels, during the period of fraudulent activ-
ity; in contrast, the comparable index approach assumes that the
price and value lines will only move in perfect correlation with each
other by coincidence. These approaches are illustrated in Figure 2.
Note that Figure 2 illustrates that both approaches obtain the
same price for the security on the date of the corrective disclosure.
Prior to the corrective disclosure date, however, the approaches typi-
cally obtain different value lines. This difference results from the fact
that the comparable index approach assumes that all price move-
ments that cannot be explained by reference to the security's covaria-
tion with a general market factor are due to the fraudulent activity.
By contrast, the event study approach assumes that the change of
price on the disclosure date best describes the influence of the
fraudulent activity for all points in time during the period of fraud,
irrespective of a general market factor.
25 Id. at 895.
26 Id. at 897.
1997] SOLVING A FLA WIN FRA UD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY
[ FIGuRE 2.
1107
The shortcomings of each approach have been widely recognized
27in the literature. Those of the comparable index approach have
been summarized as follows:
The trouble with the comparable index approach... is that it attributes
any decline in the security price that is not due to movements in the
market or the industry to disclosure of the fraud. If the disclosure of a
fraud is associated with the release of other company-specific bad news,
the comparable index approach will overestimate the true damages.28
Not surprisingly, the trouble with the event study is the opposite:
[B]y substituting predicted returns for actual returns only on disclosure
dates[,] ... the event study procedure will be biased if there is leakage
of information.... This prior information leak means that the differ-
ence between the predicted return and the actual return ... does not
properly measure the economic impact of the disclosure. As a result, a
value line which substitutes predicted returns for actual returns only on
disclosure days will understate damages.
27 See id. at 903-11; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 611, 626-30 (1985); Daniel K. Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1,
17 (1982);Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Note, Rule lOb-5 Damage Computation: Application of
Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Loss, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 838, 854-58 (1983)
[hereinafter Note, Rule 10b-5 Damage Computation]; Philip J. Leas, Note, The Measure of
Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases InvolvingActively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 393-
95 (1974).
28 Comell & Morgan, supra note 19, at 903.
Id. at 903-05.
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The empirical derivatives of the CAPM, discussed infra, are com-
monly used to calculate the value line under both the comparable in-
dex and event study approaches. A more detailed quantitative exam-
ple of the calculation of the value line is offered later in the context
of the discussion regarding those empirical derivatives.
II. THE MERGER OFJUDICIAL DOCTRINE AND FINANCIAL THEORY
A. The Theory of Fraud-on-the-Market
The judicial "hook" into capital market theory for the purpose of
satisfying the reliance requirement in Rule 10b-5 cases, without re-
quiring a plaintiff to bear the burden of positive proof of reliance on
misstatements or omissions of fact, is known as the "fraud-on-the-
market" theory. The fraud-on-the-market theory considers the effect
of misstatements or omissions of fact on a security's price in an effi-
cient market, rather than on an investor's specific cultivation of in-
formation material to making an investment decision. Thus, the
fraud-on-the-market theory presumes that in an efficient market, in-
vestors rely on the market price of a security to reflect all material in-
formation about the security.30 The assumption underlying the fraud-
on-the-market theory is that "'[tfhe market is acting as the unpaid
agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information
available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.'"3,
The Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-market theory in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,32 thereby allowing a class action brought under
Rule IOb-5 to proceed without positive proof that individual members
of the class directly relied on the misrepresentation or omission of
fact by the defendants in making their investment decisions. Basic
Inc. was a manufacturing firm whose equity securities were traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. Basic's officers entered into merger
so For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision to observe the fraud-on-the-
market theory, see generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990); see
alsoJonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017 (1991) (criticizing the dis-
tinction between efficient and inefficient markets underlying the fraud-on-the-market
theory adopted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson).
31 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) (quoting In reLTV Sec. Litig., 88
F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
32 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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negotiations with Combustion Engineering in September 1976.33 Ba-
sic's officers, however, made three public statements subsequent to
the initiation of the merger negotiations in which they denied the ex-
istence of merger discussions. Basic's board of directors approved a
tender offer by Combustion Engineering in December 1978.ss
Shareholders of Basic equity securities who sold shares during the pe-
riod commencing with the first public denial of merger negotiations
and the ultimate approval of the merger with Combustion Engineer-
ing brought suit under Rule 10b-5. The shareholders alleged that Ba-
sic's misleading statements caused the price of Basic's shares to be ar-
tificially depressed, resulting in their receiving less for their Basic
shares than they would have received in the absence of the officers'
36
misrepresentations.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Basic, the fraud-on-the-
market theory establishes a rebuttable presumption that
[a] n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does
so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly avail-
able information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on
any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for
purposes of Rule lOb-5 action.
3 7
The Court based its adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory
on its implicit assumption of the validity of the principles underlying
the ECMH, considered at length below. Although the Court did not
state its acceptance of the ECMH by name, the Court unmistakably
stated its acceptance of the ECMH in substance when it expressed
that
"[t]he fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information regarding the com-
pany and its business.... Misleading statements will therefore defraud
purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements.... The causal connection between the defendants'
fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less sig-
nificant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations."
ss
33 See id at 226-28.
s4 See id. at 227 & n.4.
3 See id at 228.
3 See id
37 Id. at 247.
8 1d. at 241-42 (alteration in original) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154,
1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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Importantly, the Court declined to delineate how to prove or dis-
prove that a market for a particular security is efficient.39 In addition,
the Court failed to address the implications for the measurement of
damages in Rule 10b-5 suits relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory
and, by implication, the ECMH.40
B. The Efficient Market Hypothesis
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Basic impliedly accepted
the ECMH when it stated that: "'[I]n an open and developed securi-
ties market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the avail-
able material information regarding the company and its business.'
41
A more refined view of the ECMH holds that prices adjust quickly and
without bias to publicly available information, or in the words of
Jensen, "[a] market is efficient with respect to [a given] information
set ... if it is impossible to make economic profits42 by trading on the
basis of [that] information set.,
43
The ECMH has been parsed into three categories: 44 the "weak"
form, the "semi-strong" form and the "strong" form. The weak form
of the ECMH holds that the price of a security reflects all the infor-
mation impounded in the security's past price series.4" The semi-
39 On the issue of proving or disproving market efficiency for a particular security,
see Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common
Stocks'Efficiency, 19J. CORP. L. 285, 290 (1994) ("[Vjolume oftradeand number of analysts
[following a stock] consistently discriminate between the efficient and inefficient
stocks in our sample .... ).
40 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28.
41 Id. at 241-42 (quoting Pei4 806 F.2d at 1160).
42 "Profits" is used as a term of art meaning "risk adjusted returns net of all costs."
Id. If an investor purchases risky asset X instead of risky asset Y, where assets X and Y
have identical risk-i.e., variation of return relative to the mean return of the asset-
both ex ante and ex post, and thereby receives a return on her investment net of ex-
penses greater than she would have received had she invested her funds in Y, she has
realized a profit.
43 Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN.
ECON. 95, 96 (1978).
4For a more detailed consideration of the three categories of the ECMH, see
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 388413 (1970).
45 The weak form of the ECMH is consistent with the statistical definition of a ran-
dom walk. In the context of our discussion, a random walk is a time series such that
the expected price of an asset in any subsequent period is equal to its price in the pre-
ceding period. In other words, at any particular point in time, the amount and direc-
tion of price change for a particular asset is random with respect to the information
available at that particular point in time. See id. at 386-87.
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strong form holds that a security's current price not only reflects all
information impounded in the series of previous prices but all pub-
licly available information that is material to the security. 6  The
strong form holds that the price of a security is an unbiased reflection
of both public and private information material to the security.4 7 In
sum, the ECMH "embraces two different kinds of claims: [1] that all
relevant information will be available to the market and [2] that the
market rapidly, if not instantaneously, digests all information as it be-
comes available."
48
Importantly, the ECMH is just that-a hypothesis. The validity of
the ECMH is not susceptible to verification for a very simple reason:
[E]very test of [ECMH] also assumes some particular theory of what the
"right" price for an asset is.... [A]sset pricing models establish the
benchmark of "normal" returns in order to determine the efficiency of
the market. Consequently, every empirical test of the efficient market
hypothesis is a "joint test" of both the hypothesis and an asset pricing
model.
49
Further, as Gilson and Black note, the ECMH is
an extreme null hypothesis that can't be strictly true. Prices can become
and remain "right" only if investors, in a constant search for bargains,
work at getting them that way. Investors will engage in this effort only if
there is profit in it. The profit, though, must come from inefficiencies
of one sort or another. Thus, there must be enough inefficiency to in-
duce investors to search for and trade on mispricing-an equilibrium
level of inefficiency. The interesting empirical question is how close
public securities markets come to being ... efficient, not whether they
are perfectly efficient.50
Even though empirical testing of the ECMH is plagued by the ir-
reconcilable joint hypotheses problem described above, many finan-
cial economists have undertaken empirical testing of the ECMH by
46 Note that the semi-strong form of the ECMH subsumes the weak form.
47 The strong form of the ECMH is the most comprehensive of the three forms
and represents an extreme notion of market efficiency. In fact, the strong form is not
satisfied in the real world. If it were, insider trading would not be the profitable activ-
ity it has been demonstrated to be. See Fama, supra note 44, at 409-10.
4s Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770-71 (1985).
49 Id- at 772.
50 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 5, at 139; see also SanfordJ. Grossman & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. ECON. REV. 393,
393 (1980) (proposing and describing "a model in which there is an equilibrium de-
gree of disequilibrium: prices [partially] reflect the information of informed indi-
viduals").
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using empirical derivations of theoretical asset-pricing models. Many
of those studies have concluded that the ECMH cannot be rejected at
a meaningful level of statistical significance, while others have deter-
mined that the ECMH cannot be accepted at a meaningful level of
statistical significance.' Regardless of the aggregate ambiguity of the
studies' conclusions, it is regarded as incontrovertible that a signifi-
cant body of empirical evidence strongly suggests that the capital
markets are highly efficient processors of information."' Therefore,
any disagreement regarding market efficiency is necessarily limited to
a debate over the degree of efficiency-i.e., whether the semi-strong
or the weak form of the ECMH better describes the capital markets.
53
For our purposes, we assume that the semi-strong form of the
ECMH is an accurate representation of the operation of the capital
markets in the United States where the subjects of the transaction at
issue are actively traded, publicly held securities. If we were to treat
the validity of the ECMH as an open question, an examination of as-
set-pricing models as applied to the measurement of damages in Rule
51 The increasing weight of the evidence against the ECMH prompted the editor
of the Financial AnalystsJournal to comment in 1984:
Enter an abundance of idiosyncrasies-small firm effect, turn-of-the-year ef-
fect, low price-earnings ratio, junk bonds (stocks?), low-priced stocks, the
Value Line phenomenon, weekend effects, performance of low beta portfo-
lios, sector rotation, and information coefficients. Documented idiosyncratic
market phenomena, like crocuses, herald a new season. The question is:
How long can the [ECMH] continue, unrevised, against the burgeoning list
of idiosyncratic phenomena?
Charles A. D'Ambrosio, Toward an Idiosyncratic Marketplace, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr.
1984, at 9, 9.
52 Much of the empirical evidence in support of the ECMH was compiled prior to
the market crash of October 1987. Since the crash, many of the financial economics
community's more notable scholars have examined the implications of the crash to
the ECMH, as the crash would appear to be a rather compelling empirical refutation
of the ECMH. For a sampling of the literature, see Fischer Black, An Equilibrium Model
of the Crash, in NBER MACROECONOMIcs ANNUAL 1988, at 269 (Stanley Fischer ed.,
1988); Eugene F. Fama, Perspectives on October 1987, or, What Did We Learn from the
Crash?, in BLACK MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 71 (Robert W.
Kamphuis, Jr. et al. eds., 1989); Kenneth R. French, Crash-Testing the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, in NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 1988, supra, at 277; Richard Roll, The
International Crash of October 1987, in BLACK MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS, supra, at 35.
53 Numerous articles of legal and economic scholarship that cast doubt on the va-
lidity of the ECMH have been published in recent years. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capi-
tal Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994); Peter Fortune, Stock Market
Efficiency: An Autopsy?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 17; Gordon & Korn-
hauser, supra note 48; Simon M. Keane, The Efficient Market Hypothesis on Tria; FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 58.
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10b-5 suits would be a significantly more difficult, if not futile, under-
taking.- Given the assumption of efficient markets, attention may
now turn to consideration of asset pricing, beginning with considera-
tion of the relationship between risk and return.
C. Risk Compensation
The fundamental postulate of financial economics, and hence of
the United States capital markets, is that the reward or return of a
particular security is a positive function of the riskO5 or uncertainty of
the reward associated with that security.s' Therefore, "assets with the
same risk should have the same expected rate of return. That is, the
prices of assets in the capital markets should adjust until equivalent
risk assets have identical expected returns." 7 The price of a risk-free
asset reflects the value of time, whereas the price of a risky asset re-
flects both the value of time and the risk of loss. This relationship be-
tween risk and return reflects the notion that the majority of investors
are risk averse."8 Defining risk precisely, however, is one of the most
difficult issues in determining 10b-5 damage.
Note that if the ex ante forecast of an asset-pricing model matched the ex post
result, two conclusions could be asserted: (1) the model is a valid description of the
pricing of securities in the particular market and the market is efficient, or (2) the
model is not a valid description of the pricing of securities in the particular market
and/or the market is not efficient, but the ex ante forecast and the ex post result match
by coincidence. Similarly, if the ex ante prediction of a model did not match the expost
result, two conclusions would obtain: (1) the model is valid but the market is not effi-
cient, or (2) the model is not valid but the market is efficient.3 Risk in capital market theory is considered to be the chance of loss-i.e., either
a negative return or a positive return that is less than a prescribed minimum. Where
the return is certain over the holding period, there is no risk. One commonly used
quantification of risk is the statistical measure known as variance (s2), which in this
context measures the degree of dispersion of returns about the expected or average
return. The larger the variance, the greater the potential dispersion of expected re-
turns, and therefore the greater the risk or uncertainty of returns.
s, = (1/n)X (ri, - R)2, where R (1/n)Z ri
1.1 1-I
where ri is the return for asset iat time t, and n is the number of observations.
The standard deviation (s) of a variable is the square root of its variance. Standard
deviation is an alternative means of measuring risk, s= (s2)1-/2
For an early empirical study regarding risk compensation, see Fischer Black et
al., The Capital Asset Pricing Modek Some Empirical Tests, in STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
CAPITAL MARKETS 79 (Michael C.Jensen ed., 1972).
57 Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Con-
cepts and Evidence, FIN. ANALYSTSJ., May-June 1974, at 69, 69.
3 A risk-averse investor is one who will "reject a fair gamble. For instance, given
some initial wealth wo and a gamble to win or lose an amount x with equal probability,
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In well-developed securities markets, such as those in the United
States, it has been observed that the prices of securities and, there-
fore, their rates of return, move in conjunction with the aggregate
market of securities. In other words, when the aggregate market ad-
vances (declines), the price and therefore the expected return of a
security in that market is also likely to advance (decline). This covari-
ance 'M of price fluctuation is due to a general market factor, i.e., an
aggregate of economic forces that influence the earnings prospects of
the majority of risky assets.
Given that a particular security is not likely to be so comprised
such that its price fluctuations always reflect only the influences of the
general market factor in a manner identical to that of the aggregate
market, the risk of any particular security may be divided into two
parts: systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk for a security
results from the covariance of returns between the security and ag-
gregate market factors; unsystematic risk is the remaining variance of
the stock unique to that stock, which is not related to market factors.
An obvious implication of these two types of risk is that an inves-
tor can reduce her risk by diversifying her securities holdings. This
condition can be illustrated by the case where an investor adds securi-
ties to her portfolio until she has achieved a portfolio that is equiva-
lent to the aggregate market. By taking such action, she eliminates
from her portfolio all vestiges of unsystematic risk.'o This type of di-
versification, where securities are added to the portfolio without con-
the investor will refuse the gamble." GORDON J. ALEXANDER &JACK CLARK FRANCIS,
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 16 (Ezra Solomon ed., 3d ed. 1986). This example implies that a
risk-averse investor requires a positive expectation of return as a prerequisite to her
participation. In contrast, a risk-seeking investor will accept a fair gamble, and a risk-
neutral investor will be indifferent to a fair gamble. The capital market theory is
premised on the notion that, on average, investors are risk averse.
59 "Covariance" (sir) is a statistical term that refers to the comovement between
random variables. A positive covariance indicates that the variables are more likely
than not to change in the same direction; a negative covariance indicates that the
variables are more likely than not to change in opposite directions.
si, = (1/n)X(r,, - A)(r, - R.),
where rit and r, t are the returns for assets i and m at time t, n is the number of
n fl
observations, I (1/n) rit, and Pr, = (1/n)Z r,,.
GO For empirical studies that examine the relationship between diversification and
risk reduction, see Lawrence Fisher & James H. Lorie, Some Studies of Variability of Re-
turns on Investments in Common Stocks, 43 J. Bus. 99 (1970); W.H. Wagner & S.C. Lau,
The Effect ofDiversification on Risk, FIN. ANALYSTSJ., Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 48.
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sideration of the covariances between securities, is referred to as sim-
ple diversification.
Markowitz diversification provides a contrast to simple diversifica-
tion:
Markowitz diversification involves combining securities with less than
perfect positive correlation in order to reduce risk in the portfolio with-
out sacrificing any of the portfolio's return. In general, the lower the
correlations (or, equivalently, covariances) of the assets in a portfolio,
the less risky the portfolio will be. This is true regardless of how risky
the assets of the portfolio are when analyzed in isolation.1
Like simple diversification, Markowitz diversification can significantly
reduce risk, but it cannot entirely eliminate it-barring the unlikely
case where an investor creates a portfolio of securities having per-
fectly negative covariance of returns. The concept of risk reduction
through diversification is illustrated in Figure 3.
FIGuRE 3. THE EFFECT OF DIVERSIFICATION ON
SYSTEMATIC AND UNSYSTEMATIC RISK
A: Total Risk
a B: Unsystematic Risk
C Systematic Risk
Standard
Deviation
of Portfolio (A)
Return
Number of Securities in Portfolio
Importantly, under Markowitz diversification, the investor's ex-
pected return does not necessarily decrease as a result of the reduc-
tion of risk. This result follows from the observation that a portfolio's
expected return is equal to the weighted average of the individual se-
curities' expected returns, but a portfolio's variance is equal to the
61 ALEXANDER & FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 48.
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weighted average of the individual securities' variances of return and
covariances of return.
6
This concept of undiminished return in the event of diminished
risk is illustrated by a simple example presented by Vasicek and
McQuown:
Consider two different common stocks. Assume for simplicity that
they both have the same expected rate of return, E. If a part of the
wealth available for investment, call it x1 , is allocated to one stock and
the remaining part x2 = 1 - x1 is invested in another, the expected rate of
return, EP, on this two-issue portfolio is a weighted average of the two
expected returns, or
EP = xIE + x 2E = E.
The expected return on the portfolio is thus equal to that of either
stock, since we, of course, assumed them to be the same. The volatility
of the two-issue portfolio, however, is less (as will be seen) than the vola-
tility of either stock, if only we assume them to comove through time
imperfectly.
According to a theorem in statistics, the variance VP of the portfolio
is computed as:
VP = x 21V, + x22V2 + 2xIx2C 2 -.
In this equation, V1 and V2 are variances of the two stocks, respectively;
C12 is the covariance of their returns, and x1, x2 are their weights in the
portfolio. The covariance term is crucial to the effect of diversification.
If the two issues fluctuate in price independently of each other, then the
covariance term is zero, and it is always possible to choose the relative
proportions x1, x2 in such a way that the risk of the portfolio is smaller
than that of either stock taken separately. This is due to the effect of
squaring numbers less than one. For instance, when the volatility of
both stocks is the same, V1 = V2, and the covariance is zero, the risk of a
portfolio of equal investment in each stock is
VP = (.5) 2V + (.5)2 V2 = .5V1 .
Thus, the portfolio has a variance equal to only one half of the variance
of either stock. Since the expected return on the portfolio is not re-
62 The expected return, (E)rp, of the portfolio is
(E)rp= x,(E)ri, where xi is the proportion of the portfolio invested in asset i, andi-I
(E)ri is the expected return to asset .
The expected variance (s2) of the portfolio is s2 = skxixk, where s3r is the
i-I k-I
covariance of return between assets i and k
SeeALEXANDER & FRANcIs, supra note 58, at 43, 45.
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duced (i.e., as shown above EP = E), such a portfolio is clearly preferable
to a single-issue portfolio for any investor who is averse to risk.
Typically, two stocks exhibit some positive comovement; therefore
the covariance term cannot be realistically assumed to be zero. The re-
duction of risk in that case is not as large as if the two stocks were inde-
pendent, but it always can be made smaller than the simple average risk
of the two stocks. Hence, the amount of risk per unit of expected re-
turn can be decreased through diversification.
Given that unsystematic risk can be reduced by diversification-
and, in theory, eliminated-an investor should expect to be rewarded
only for her portfolio's exposure to systematic risk. The importance
of the foregoing to the measurement of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases
is relatively straightforward: An investor injured by fraudulent con-
duct with respect to the expected return for a security is injured only
with respect to the unsystematic risk she suffers from the fraud.
Therefore, the systematic risk compensation of the security during
the period of the fiaudulent activity must be separated from the total
risk compensation, leaving only the unsystematic risk compensation.
However, measurement of a security's level of systematic risk requires
a valid description of the manner in which assets should be priced in
an efficient capital market. The most prominent of such models is
the Capital Asset-Pricing Model. As mentioned previously, the
CAPM's empirical derivations have been applied-in error, as we will
show-to the task of damages measurement in Rule 10b-5 cases with
great regularity. Therefore,, a brief examination of the CAPM is in
order.
D. The Capital Asset-Pricing Model
The CAPM is a capital market theory which provides that, in equi-
librium, a security will have an expected return that is a positive linear
function of its covariance with the market portfolio. The CAPM is
characterized by the descriptive equation, [Efri = rf + bi([EJrm - rf),
63 Oldrich A. Vasicek & John A. McQuown, The Efficient Market Mode4 FIN.
ANALYSTSJ., Sept.-Oct. 1972, at 71, 76-77.
64 'Market portfolio" as used here is a term of art. The market portfolio in the
context of the CAPM specifically refers to
a portfolio containing all marketable assets in the proportions xb where xi =(total value of asset i) - (total value of all assets in the market). The reason all
marketable assets must be in [the market portfolio] is simply that if an asset
were not in [the market portfolio], no investor would own it and thus markets
would not clear.
ALEXANDER & FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 109.
1118 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1097
where [E]ri is the expected return on security i for the period, [E]rm is
the expected return on the market portfolio for the period, rf is the
return on a risk-free5 security for the period, and bi is the sensitivity
or risk coefficient of security i relative to the market portfolio-i.e., bi
is a measure of security 's systematic risk. As detailed above, the risk
coefficient of security i is defined algebraically as bi =
s([E]r, [E]rm)/s 2 ([E]rm), and is equal to the slope of a straight line con-
necting the risk-free security with the market portfolio. "Thus, the
covariance of [a security's] return with the market portfolio's return,
not its variance of return, determines [a security's] expected return
and is therefore the relevant measure of the [security's] risk."o In
other words, the CAPM indicates that investors do not receive unsys-
tematic risk compensation in equilibrium; they receive only the risk-
free rate and a risk premium proportional to a security's level of sys-
tematic risk. In sum, the CAPM states that, given market conditions
expressed in [E]rm and rp the expected return on a security is a linear
function of the security's systematic risk. The greater the risk, the
greater the expected return.
The assumptions underlying the CAPM are as restrictive as they
are numerous. The following list represents the commonly accepted
assumptions of the CAPM:
(1) All investors have identical expectations about security rewards;
(2) all investors have identical expectations about security risks;r7
(3) investors experience identical net returns (taxes and investment
expenses are identical);
(4) there are no investment constraints (no limits on borrowing-or
lending, no short-selling restrictions, no upper bounds on holdings);
Risk-free means that the nominal return for the period is known with certainty.
It does not consider risks to the purchasing power of the principal from inflation.
ALEXANDER& FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 113.
67Assumptions (1) and (2) express the notion that investors have "homogeneous
expectations'-i.e., all investors "have the same one-period investment horizon and
have the same perceptions regarding securities' ex ante expected returns, variances,
and covariances." ALEXANDER & FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 107. For an argument
about why heterogeneity of opinion is essential to the operation of capital markets, see
Joram Mayshar, On Divergence of Opinion and Imperfections in Capital Markets, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 114 (1983).
W The assets are also infinitely divisible-i.e., partial rights to the assets may be
exchanged.
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(5) there is a risk-free asset, which is borrowed or lent at identical
69
rates;
(6) all investors maximize mean/variance utility functions over a
common investment horizon and are risk-averse;
(7) investors experience risk only from the [market] portfolio (there
are no risky assets or liabilities excluded from the problem);
(8) markets are perfect (each investor is a price-taker who does not be-
lieve he can influence price, there are no transaction costs and no costs
of acquiring information)."
Note that these assumptions do not allow for diversity of invest-
ment objectives and holding periods. They also eliminate considera-
tion of disparate information acquisition across investors. Note also
that Rosenberg has observed that the CAPM assumptions necessarily
imply the following:
(1) Each individual investor's portfolio satisfies the Markowitz condi-
* 72
tion;
(2) each investor'sportfolio of risky assets has the same composition as
all other investors';'-
(3) the market portfolio, which is the aggregate of all portfolios, there-
fore has this same composition;
(4) hence, the market portfolio is efficient 74 for all investors, the
unique "mutual fund" of all risky assets that exactly suits the needs of all
investors;
69 More refined versions of the CAPM consider the implications of a higher rate of
interest for borrowing, see Fischer Black, Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Bor-
rowing, 45J. Bus. 444 (1972); Black, supra note 56, at 98.
70 For a discussion of utility functions and their role in portfolio theory, see
ALEXANDER & FRANcIS, supra note 58, at 8-41.
71 Barr Rosenberg, The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Market Model J.
PORTFOLIO MoNIT., Winter 1981, at 5, 6.
72 The Markowitz condition is a consequence of Markowitz diversification and
holds that there exists an infinite number of combinations or portfolios of risky assets
for which their expected returns are superior to all other combinations having identi-
cal levels of expected risk or variance of returns. This set of portfolios is known as the
efficient frontier. See HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECION: EFFICIENT
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7J. FIN.
77 (1952).
7s This condition is known as the "separation theorem" which states that "the op-
timal investment decision is to buy what is known as the market portfolio .... This in-
vestment decision is, in turn, separate (meaning independent) from the decision
about how to finance it-that is, whether to lend or borrow at the risk-free rate."
ALEXANDER & FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 109.
74 "An efficient portfolio has (1) greater expected return than any other portfolio
in its risk class (that is, any other portfolio with the same variability of returns) and (2)
1120 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1097
(5) since the market portfolio is efficient, any other portfolio of risky
assets is inferior;7
(6) investors price each security in the market [portfolio] so that its ex-
pected reward compensates for its contribution to risk in the market
portfolio... ;
(7) hence, every portfolio ... other than the market portfolio is infe-
rior to the market portfolio because it has incremental diversifiable
[unsystematic] risk.
Thus, in the world of the CAPM, investors compete with one an-
other to assemble efficient portfolios. 77 As a consequence of this
competition, "an asset's price reflects only the risk it contributes to a
perfectly diversified portfolio. The market compensates investors,
through greater expected return [s,] ... only for that element of risk
that cannot be eliminated by [Markowitz] diversificaon." 78
Professors Gordon and Kornhauser provide a succinct and acces-
sible exposition of the implications of the CAPM:
CAPM implies that efficient portfolios consist of a combination of the
market portfolio and the risk-free asset, in positive or negative amounts.
Because optimal diversification eliminates nonsystematic risk, the best
portfolio is the market portfolio, which by definition is subject only to
systematic risk. An investor who wishes a portfolio less risky than the
market should reduce her holdings of the market portfolio and acquire
risk-free assets. Conversely, an investor seeking greater risk should lev-
erage her holdings of the market portfolio by borrowing....
The [security] market line represents expected returns at particular lev-
els of risk from combinations of the most efficient portfolio of risky as-
sets (presumably the market portfolio M) with the risky asset in positive
(lending) or negative (borrowing) amounts. The gap between the
[security] market line and the efficient portfolio (of risky assets) frontier
represents the gains from using [the] so-called Separation Theorem in
the construction of portfolios.
For those more accustomed to algebra, consider the following ex-
ample: Assume that the risk-free return [rf] is 8%, that the expected re-
less risk than any other portfolio with the same level of expected return." Id. at 52.
The set of all efficient portfolios is known as the efficient frontier.
75 This means inferior in the context of mean-variance efficiency. The returns to
the inferior portfolio are less than should be expected given the variance of the re-
turns of the portfolio.
76 Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 6.
77 Note that "[i]f the CAPM were strictly true, there would be no active manage-
ment [of securities portfolios]. All investor expectations would be identical, and all
investors would hold a single 'consensus portfolio.'" Id. at 7.
78 Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 778.
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turn on a low beta (0.5) stock portfolio is 12%, and that the expected
return on the market portfolio (beta = 1.0) is 20%. An investor seeking
a risk level (or beta) of 0.5 can improve on the 12% expected return
available from a portfolio solely of risky assets by putting half her funds
in the market portfolio and half in risk-free assets (Treasury bills, e.g.).
Her expected return from such a portfolio is 14%. ((.5 x .08) + (.5 x
.20) =.14). 7
Figure 4 illustrates these concepts.
FIGURE 4.
Expected Market portfolio M Security Market
Return point at which ie(SML)(%) SML is tangentto EPF Moi
20M Efficient Portfolio
Frontier (EPF)
14-
12 
?
.5 1.0 1.5 Risk (Beta)
P, Lending The set ofportfolios comprised of the
risk-free asset and the market portfolio.
MZ: Borrowing The set ofportfolios comprised of the
market portfolio and financed by means of
borrowing at the risk-free rate.
Figure 4 also illustrates the following more general conclusions
outlined by Vasicek and McQuown:
1. In an efficient market, every investor should be expected to hold a
combination of the riskless asset and the market portfolio. Such combi-
nations of assets dominate any other alternatives in the sense that they
are subject to less risk for the same level of expected return. The pro-
portions to be invested in the risk[-free] asset and in the market portfo-
lio depend solely on each investor's tradeoff of risk and expected re-
turn.
2. In an efficient market, the expected return on each [security] in ex-
cess of the risk-free rate is related only to its beta. A stock with a beta
twice as high as another stock exhibits twice as high an expected excess
80
return.
Id. at 780 n.46 (citation omitted).
Vasicek & McQuown, supra note 63, at 81.
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The first conclusion describes how rational investors should be-
have in an efficient market; the second conclusion predicts how an
efficient market would clear, given the assumptions of the model.
The first conclusion is normative, the second positive. As such, the
second conclusion may be subject to empirical study.
III. MOVING FROM THEORY TO APPLICATION
A. The Market Model
Although the CAPM describes how investors should be compen-
sated for ex ante risk that they take in investment, it does not show the
ex post relationship between securities returns and the market. That
ex post relationship is described by the market model. That is, the
market model is a return-generating model that attempts to describe
how capital markets price assets or provide risk compensation ex post,
whereas the CAPM only considers ex ante risk compensation. The
market model holds that the return of a security is a linear function
of both a market factor common to all securities and an independent
factor unique to the particular security. Thus, the market model di-
vides the return to a security into the two components discussed ear-
lier: systematic risk compensation and unsystematic risk compensa-
tion.
The market model may be expressed algebraically as follows: r =
CXi + flirn + Ei, where /3, beta, is a constant and is a measure of the secu-
rity's systematic risk;"' ri is the return to asset k, r. is the return to the
market proxy; ai, alpha, is a constant and a measure of the security's
abnormal return;8 2 and Ei is a random-error term for security i having
a mean of zero. If the market model can be justified for use in testing
the CAPM, then its use can also be justified for the purpose of meas-
uring returns to a security in positive or negative excess of the risk
compensation the security would have earned in the absence of
fraudulent conduct. Therefore, the market model would represent a
viable methodology for the measurement of damages in Rule 10b-5
81 The use of the beta coefficient, expressed as s(im)/s2m as a measure of risk de-
pends upon the empirical validity of the market model. Beta may be justified as a
measure of risk by reference to the portfolio selection approach of Markowitz or to the
equilibrium approach of Sharpe and Lintner. See Marshall E. Blume, On the Assessment
f Risk, 26J. FIN. 1, 1-2 (1971).
"Abnormal return" is the return remaining after the security's rate of return is
adjusted for its systematic risk compensation. Recall that in the world of the CAPM,
unsystematic risk is not compensated, therefore, abnormal returns are never observed.
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cases. Alexander and Francis present the following use of the market
model to test the CAPM:
The market model and the CAPM, despite being two independent and
distinctly different models, have certain links to each other. The market
model is a return-generating model and is based on the simple assump-
tion that security returns conform to a multivariate normal distribu-
tion.... [I]t can be expressed algebraically as
ri=ai+Pirm+ei, [1]8
where /3 = cov(ri, rj/c 2m. The CAPM is an equilibrium one-period
model that explains expected returns and is based on a set of assump-
tions given earlier [in this paper]. Algebraically, it was shown to be
equal to
[E~i i  . 84[Ei =rf+ ([Elin- r)fi. [2]
Given the expected return on the market i,, the market model ex-
presses a security's expected return as
[Eli = ai + I3ifEliT. [3]
In comparing equations [2] and [3], it can be seen that if the CAPM is
valid, then a = AU,(1 - r). As will be shown next, the CAPM is typically
converted from an ex ante model to an ex post or empirical model by
merging it with a return-generating model.
By assuming that the multivariate normal distribution of returns is sta-
tionary over time, equations [1] and [2] can be modified by adding time
subscripts. Furthermore, it can be noted from equation [3] that ai = ri -
3ifi. Substituting this expression for a i into the time-subscripted version
of equation [1] results in a form of the market model that can be viewed
as a return-generating model,
r = IEfi + (r., - [Eli, + e, - [4)
83 Note that a and Pi are constants for the security / rm is the return on an under-
lying factor as quantified through its influence on the market portfolio proxy; and E, is
the random-error term on the security i. Further note that Alexander and Francis ob-
serve that because the market model:
is based on the assumption that the joint probability distribution between r
and r., is stationary and bivariate normal [where ru and r. denote the returns
to security i and the market proxy m for holding period t]. As a result of this
assumption, the error term [efa ] has the following properties:
1. The en's average value is zero ....
2. The variance of eil... is constant....
3. The error terms are uncorrelated with rm..
ALEXANDER & FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 75.
Note that [Elii and [Eli. denote the expected return of security i and the mar-
ket portfolio, respectively.
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Substituting the expression for [Elfi [as shown in a time-subscripted ver-
sion of equation [2]] into equation [4] results in
ri, =rlf + fli(r. - rft) + E. [5]
Now, rearranging equation [5] and adding an intercept term, the fol-
lowing ex post version of the CAPM is created:
r, - r f = -i +1 A0". -rd + Ei, [6]
Taking the expected value of equation [6] and rearranging terms indi-
cates that the intercept term ai is equal to
ai = ([E]i,- [E]7f) -1,U([Elfm - [E]i). [7]
Now the term AI([Eli, - [E]i1) must be equal to ([E]i - [Eli1 ) by the
CAPM. Accordingly, the true value of ai is zero and sample estimates of
it should not be significantly different from zero if the CAPM is valid
and stationary over time.
Finally, if equation [1] is applied to sample data for a given stock that
has been generated by the CAPM, then the estimated values of a i and f3i
will be biased in opposite directions if r/f and r. are correlated over
time. However, empirical studies indicate that estimates of f3i derived
from the market model and CAPM are quite similar in magnitude.
Thus, the conceptual problem of using the market model to estimate f3i
when the CAPM is assumed to be valid does not seem to create any seri-
85
ous empirical problems.
The constants in the market model equations (ai and fl3) are typi-
cally determined by ordinary least squares regression ("OLS") .86 The
OLS regression equation represents a straight line drawn through a
set of points that depict the relationship between the return on the
security and the market proxy such that the sum of the squares of the
distances between the points and the line is minimized.
As argued above, "the true value of ai [alpha, which measures a
security's abnormal return] is zero and sample estimates of it [such as
those determined by the market model] should not be significantly
different from zero if the CAPM is valid and stationary over time.",
7
The implication of this observation for measurement of damages in
Rule 10b-5 cases is straightforward. By use of the market model, it
may be possible to determine the return or risk compensation struc-
ture of security i for a given period relative to the return of the mar-
ket portfolio for the same period. Recall that it has been shown
85 ALEXANDER& FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 116-17 (footnotes omitted).86 A detailed discussion of regi-ession analysis may be found in Franklin M. Fisher,
Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980).
ALEXANDER & FRANCIS, supra note 58, at 117.
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above that if the CAPM is valid, a security will not earn an abnormal
return. Therefore, determining that a security under scrutiny in a
Rule 1Ob-5 case has in fact experienced an abnormal return during
the period of the fraudulent conduct is equivalent to measuring dam-
ages because in the world of CAPM, only systematic risk is compen-
sated.
Application of the market model to the measurement of damages
is relatively straightforward and seductively simple. The process is
analogous to Security Market Line ("SML") analysis:
The SML [expresses] ... the relationship between risk and return pre-
dicted by the mean-variance model, namely that risk, as measured by
beta, and expected return are linearly related. SML analysis interprets
deviations in expected return from the SML as abnormal returns above
or below what is appropriate or warranted for the amount of risk taken
88
on.
In the measurement of damages, the market model is used to calcu-
late the expected return for the security given its level of risk. From
the calculated expected return, the corresponding expected price of
the security is determined. The difference between the price re-
quired to result in the expected return and the actual market price is
the amount of damage an investor may have sustained per unit of the
security purchased or sold. For illustrative purposes, one example is
provided below. Note that this example is not illustrative of every
possible type of injury that may result from a misrepresentation that
influences the price of the entity's securities.
Assume that XYZ corporation intentionally overstated its prospec-
tive earnings for the forthcoming quarter, thereby artificially inflating
the price of its common stock. Later, XYZ made a corrective disclo-
sure to remedy the misrepresentation, and at such time, the price of
XYZ common stock dropped 30.13%. The estimate of damages for a
particular plaintiff would be calculated by the following process:
First, the market model regression equation for XYZ common
must be calculated for a period prior to the misrepresentation.
Second, the observed return of the market portfolio, in this case
the S&P 500 for the period of the fraudulent conduct-the period
beginning with the plaintiff's purchase of the security and ending
with the date of corrective disclosure-must be calculated.
88 Philip H. Dybvig & Stephen A. Ross, The Analytics of Performance Measurement Us-
ing a Security Market Lin4 40J. FIN. 401,401 (1985); see also supra fig.4 (SML analysis).
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Third, the estimated return of XYZ common must be calculated
for the same period as used to calculate the return on the market
portfolio. This is accomplished by applying the previously calculated
market return to the market model regression equation derived for
XYZ common.
Fourth, the implied price of XYZ common for the date of the
plaintiff's purchase must be calculated using the estimated return cal-
culated in step three.
Finally, the difference between the actual price paid by the plain-
tiff and the implied price of XYZ common on the date of the pur-
chase is the measure of damages per unit of the security, provided
this difference is positive. Where the plaintiff sold her holdings prior
to the date of corrective disclosure, her measure of damages is the
difference between the damages as measured for the purchase date
and the sale date, provided this difference is positive.
The following is a quantitative illustration '9 of the preceding
process, where the market model regression equation for XYZ com-
mon relative to the S&P 500 Index is assumed to be rxy, = .0005 +
1.5rsp50 and the plaintiff purchased one share of XYZ common after
the misrepresentation of expected earnings at the market price of
$29.25; on the same date, the S&P 500 level was 473.28. The correc-
tive disclosure date price of XYZ common was $20.00; the S&P 500
Index level was 446.77. The return for the S&P 500 Index for the pe-
riod is -5.6%, ((446.77 - 473.28)/473.28 = -5.6%). The estimated re-
turn for XYZ common over the same period is -8.35%: (.0005 + 1.5(-
.056) = -8.35%). The implied price of XYZ common for the date of
the plaintiffs purchase is $21.82: ($20.00/(1 - .0835) = $21.82). The
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff is $7.43: ($29.25 -
$21.82). Calculation of the difference between the market price and
the estimated price for each day of the period of fraudulent conduct
results in the value line discussed above.
B. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Analysis and the CAPM
In the preceding Sections, we distinguished between the market
model and the CAPM. In particular, as we noted, the CAPM is used
to analyze in advance the expected trade-off between risk and return
for a given security or a given portfolio of securities. The CAPM itself,
89This example is based upon the market model calculation of damages example
featured in Note, Rule 10b-5 Damage Computation, supra note 27, at 869.
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therefore, is inherently based on expectations about the future. The
market model, on the other hand, examines the ex post relationship
between the market return and the return for a single security or a
portfolio of securities. The market model, therefore, is intrinsically
concerned with ex post analysis. In fact, an ex post analysis is necessary
for determining damages in Rule 10b-5 cases because those damages
measure the difference between what the return for the security
would have been without the fraud and what the return actually was,
taking into account overall economic changes that occurred during
the period of the fraud. In the case of the market model, those eco-
nomic changes are reduced to a single factor: the return on the mar-
ket. Thus, damages in 10b-5 cases devolve into a simple question:
What would the return to this stock have been, given the actual ex post
observations on market returns, the long term historical relation be-
tween ex post market returns, and returns for the stock? Damages oc-
cur to the extent that actual realized ex post returns for the stock differ
from what the stock returns would have been based solely on the real-
ized values of the market return.
Importantly, we contend that the legal literature and commenta-
tors have almost universally misunderstood the difference between
using the CAPM in an ex post and an ex ante sense in the Rule 10b-5
damage context. In particular, the legal community, to date, has
failed to appreciate how this difference affects the way that empirical
analysis is performed to determine whether the CAPM is useful from
an investment perspective. A proper analysis of the CAPM for in-
vestment purposes compares actual ex post realized returns on particu-
lar stocks with the ex ante data for those stocks to determine whether,
over some apt horizon, the average return for high beta stocks is
greater than the average return for low beta stocks. Such investment
analysis employs, by its nature, ex ante data, because investment deci-
sions at any time were made using data available up to that time.
In contrast, any analysis in a Rule 1Ob-5 damages case is necessar-
ily ex post. All data on actual market returns, as well as returns on the
individual stock, are available. Therefore, we can ask the question:
What would the return have been for the stock based on the actual
realized returns on the market? This contrariety between damage as-
sessment and investment decisionmaking has important implications
for how we interpret the literature on tests of the CAPM. The vast
bulk of the finance literature on tests of the CAPM90 focuses only on
9o See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth L French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock
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the predictive ability of the CAPM, not on its ex post explanation of re-
turns. Consequently, these articles on the predictive power of the
CAPM are completely irrelevant for determining whether the CAPM
is valuable to measure damages under Rule 10b-5.
In fact, the only criterion that should be used in determining
which model is best suited for measuring damages under Rule 10b-5
is how well that model ex post can describe the historical relationship
between the return of the stock of the firm subject to the Rule 10b-5
action and general conditions in the economy. It makes little sense
to assume that the market model, which tries to explain all returns for
individual firms based on the returns for the market as a whole,
would offer the best explanation for describing how a stock's returns
would have changed in the absence of fraud. Importantly, however,
any model which explains the ex post return of stocks will be highly
relevant for measuring Rule 10b-5 damages. Thus, the important
empirical question is whether or not the market model is the best
model for explaining ex post returns for stocks. If the market model is
not the best model for assessing Rule lOb-5 damages, then another,
more sophisticated model is required.
IV. MULTI-FACTOR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MODELS
A. General Models
When we were analyzing how to measure returns using the stock
market as a whole as the only controlling factor, we were very clear in
distinguishing between the CAPM, which is based on ex ante analysis,
and the market model, which is based on ex post analysis. One ques-
tion remains, however: Is the movement in general stock returns the
only relevant factor to control for in assessing damages? If there are
other factors that help to explain the ex post realized returns on an
individual stock in a 101>-5 case, then these factors should also be used
to determine the portion of the stock return not explained by the
fraudulent action. Indeed, we contend that a more sophisticated
model will yield more credible results than a simple market model.
But how do we develop such a model? The model that we really
need for damage assessment is an ex post model, and there has been
relatively little work in finance examining what ex post models best ex-
Returns, 47J. FIN. 427 (1992); Eugene Fama &James MacBeth, Risk, Return, and Equilib-
rium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607 (1973); Ravi Jagannathan & Zhenyu Wang,
The Conditional CAPM and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns, 51J. FIN. 3 (1996).
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plain realized stock returns. There has been, however, a significant
amount of work in finance analyzing ex ante models that attempt to
predict what returns will be based on utilizing more than just the sin-
gle overall stock market index. These models are generally called
multi-factor models and have often been justified by the arbitrage
pricing theory ("APT"). As part of our justification for using multi-
factor models, we turn now to a discussion of the APT and its applica-
tion in modern finance. Note, however, that since the APT is really
an ex ante model, we will propose another model, an ex post model, for
use in damage assessments in a multi-factor world. As we will demon-
strate, one can analogize the model we will use to the APT, just as the
market model is analogized to the CAPM.
APT, like the CAPM, is a theory of asset pricing that describes the
cross-section of returns of assets in equilibrium as a linear function of
systematic risk. However, unlike the CAPM, which explains the cross-
section of returns as a function of the "covariance between asset re-
turns and an endogenous preference-based aggregate,""1 APT ex-
plains the cross-section of returns as a function of the "covariance be-
tween asset returns and factors in the return generating process."9 2
APT holds that "the expected return on any asset is directly related to
that asset's sensitivity to unanticipated movements in major economic
factors.
9 3
In both the APT and the CAPM, it is assumed that unsystematic
risk can be eliminated by proper diversification. The APT further as-
sumes that competitive forces in the market quickly and without bias
eliminate arbitrage profit opportunities. The absence of arbitrage
opportunities means that "investor[s] cannot earn a positive expected
rate of return on any combination of assets.., without making some
net investment.""4 The absence of arbitrage profits follows from the
APT's assumption that investors prefer more return to less for a given
level of risk and prefer less risk to more for a given level of return.
Investors acting in accordance with this assumption will therefore
change their portfolio asset composition by assuming both long and
short positions when given an opportunity to increase return without
9 Jay Shanken, Multi-Beta CAPM orEquilibrium-APT?: A Reply, 40J. FIN. 1189, 1189
(1985) (footnote omitted).
92Id.
93 Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage Pricing Theory Approach to Strategic
Portfolio Planning, FIN. ANALYSTsJ., May-June 1984, at 14, 18.
Michael A. Berry et al., Sorting Out Risks Using Known APT Factors, FIN. ANALYSTS
J., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 29, 30.
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increasing risk or decrease risk without decreasing return. In sum-
mary, the APT assumes a world in which "the relationship between
return and risk will be determined by self-interested investors who will
exploit opportunities to build portfolios of short and long positions,
while making zero investment [as the proceeds from the short posi-
tions finance the long positions] but certain, positive returns." 95
The APT return-generating process is characterized by the follow-
ing linear K-factor model:
K -
= + Zbikak + 8tj, [11
k=l
where Rj is:
the return on asset i between dates t - 1 and t, Ei is the asset's expected
return, 8R is the realization of the kth common factor (normalized to
have a zero population mean), bk is the sensitivity of the return of asset i
to the kth common factor (called the factor loading), and F, is
the... [unsystematic] return on the ith asset, which is assumed to have
zero mean and finite variance, and to be sufficiently independent across
securities so that... [unsystematic] risk can be eliminated in large, well-
diversified portfolios. '
The APT further assumes that investors "agree on both the factor
coefficients, bilki and the expected returns, Ei."9 7  The return-
generating process described by equation [1] states that the return to
an asset is equal to the asset's expected return (Ei)-which is the sum
of the asset's returns to anticipated changes in the systematic risk fac-
tors-plus the asset's unanticipated return (bikSkt)-which is the sum
of the asset's returns to unanticipated changes in the systematic risk
factors-plus the asset's unsystematic risk return (eit)-which is the
return to the asset's unsystematic risk, a return which is assumed to
have a mean of zero.
The developer of the APT, Stephen A. Ross,98 as well as others,
demonstrated that the
absence of riskless arbitrage opportunities implies that expected returns
[Ei] must satisfy (approximately):
9 Dorothy H. Bower et al., Arbitrage Pricing Theory and Utility Stock Returns, 39J. FIN.
1041, 1043 (1984).
Bruce N. Lehmann & David M. Modest, The Empirical Foundations of the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory, 21J. FIN. ECON. 213, 215 (1988).
Richard Roll & Stephen A. Ross, An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory, 35J. FIN. 1073, 1082 (1980).
98 See Stephen A. Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing 13 J. ECON.
THEORY 341 (1976).
1997] SOLVING A FLAWIN FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY 1131
E, =-X0 + bilk, +. . . + b~k, [2]
as the number of assets satisfying the factor model (1] tends toward in-
finity where Ao is the intercept of the pricing relation and Ak is the risk
premium on the kth common factor, k= 1, .. I j
Roll points out that in equation [21
[i]f there is a riskless asset with return, EO, then bq = 0 and Eo = A,
hence... [equation [2] may be expressed as follows]
E -Eo = Xbi, +. . .+ Xkb
with the understanding that Eo is the riskless rate of return if such an as-
set exists, and is the common return on all 'zero-beta' assets, i.e., assets
with b=i = 0, for all, whether or not a riskless asset exists.100
A simple example of the APT relationship assuming a single fac-
tor is presented by Roll and reproduced here as illustrated in Figure
5:
If there is a single factor, then the APT pricing relationship is a line
in expected return, Ej, systematic risk, bi, space:
Ej -E0 = Xbi.
Figure [5] can be used to illustrate our argument geometrically. Sup-
pose, for example, that assets 1, 2, and 3 are presently held in positive
amounts in some portfolio and that asset 2 is above the line connecting
assets 1 and 3. Then a portfolio of 1 and 3 could be constructed with
the same systematic risk as asset 2, but with a lower expected return. By
selling assets 1 and 3 in the proportions they represent of the initial
portfolio and buying more of asset 2 with the proceeds, a new position
would be created with the same overall risk and a greater return. Such
arbitrage opportunities will be unavailable only when assets lie along a
line. Notice that the intercept on the expected return axis would be Eo
when no arbitrage opportunities are present.
Lehmann & Modest, supra note 96, at 215.
ID Roll & Ross, supra note 97, at 1078-79.
101 Id. at 1079.
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FiGURE 5.
R.
Roll further notes that
[t]he pricing relationship [E = X0 + X bil +... + Xjb,] is the central con-
clusion of the APT .... but it is natural to ask what interpretation can
be given to the XtkA factor risk premia. By forming portfolios with unit
systematic risk on each factor and no risk on other factors, each ?'Ik can
be interpreted as Xk = Elk] - E0, the excess return or market risk pre-
mium on portfolios with only systematic factor k risk. Then [Ei = X0 + X,
bu +... + X.kbi,] can be rewritten as,
E,- 0 = (El - 0 )bj, +... + (Ek -E0 )bk-.1
2
The assumptions of the APT, like those of the CAPM, tend to dif-
fer as the theoretical derivation of the model under investigation
tends to vary from the original proponent's explication. As a general
matter, it is acknowledged that the assumptions of the APT are less
restrictive than those of the CAPM. In addition to the assumptions
detailed above, the following assumptions or a subset of the following
assumptions are common to theoretical derivations of the APT:
1. Each asset has small idiosyncratic [unsystematic] variance, i.e., var(,)
is small.
2. Each asset has small supply in the economy (at least in the limit).
3. There is a portfolio which, up to a constant, mimics factorj (at least
approximately, perhaps in the limit).
1V2 Id.
b, b2 b3
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4. Some agent holds a well-diversified portfolio that does not contain
any idiosyncratic risk.
5. There is no arbitrage (directly or in some asymptotic sense).
6. There is Pareto efficiency and/or aggregation....
8. All assets are in positive supply.
0 3
B. Identification of Risk Factors
If we want to identify the multiple factors that we might use in a
multi-factor damage assessment model under Rule 10b-5 for ex post
analysis of stock returns, one place to start is the empirical research
done on ex ante multi-factor models of stock returns, namely the em-
pirical versions of the APT. The factors that are significant in multi-
factor ex ante models of stock returns may potentially also be signifi-
cant in expost models as well.
Empirical research'04 indicates that unanticipated changes in the
following four economic factors are particularly relevant to explain-
ing ex ante stock returns using the APT:
(1) inflation;
(2) industrial production;
(3) risk premiums, as measured by the rate differential
between low grade and high grade bonds; and
(4) the slope of the term structure of interest rates.'05
The changes in the systematic factors that influence asset returns
must necessarily be unanticipated. In an efficient market, anticipated
changes have already been impounded into the expected return (E)
of an asset.
Roll and Ross note that it is not surprising that the four economic
factors detailed above have been found to be important determinants
of asset returns:
103 Philip H. Dybvig & Stephen A. Ross, Yes, theAPTIs Testable 40J. FIN. 1173, 1175
(1985).
104 Empirical research with equities is described in the following works: StephenJ.
Brown & Mark I. Weinstein, A New Approach to Testing Asset Pricing Models: The Bilinear
Paradigm, 38J. FIN. 711 (1983); Lawrence Kryzanowski & Minh Chan To, GeneralFactor
Models and the Structure of Security Returns, 18 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 31
(1983); Marc R. Reinganum, The Arbitrage Pricing Theory: Some Empirical Results, 36J.
FIN. 313 (1981); Roll & Ross, supra note 97.105 Roll & Ross, supra note 93, at 19.
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They appear in the traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation
formula. V 6Two of them-(unanticipated] changes in industrial pro-
duction and unanticipated inflation-are related to the numerator in
the DCF formula, i.e., to the expected cash flows themselves. Expected
industrial production is a proxy for the real value of future cash flows.
Inflation enters because assets are not neutral; their nominal cash flow
growth rates do not always match expected inflation rates.
The other two variables would seem intuitively to be more related to
the denominator in the DCF formula-i.e., to the risk-adjusted discount
rate. The risk premium measure is an amalgam of investor attitudes to-
ward risk-bearing and perceptions about the general level of uncer-
tainty. The term structure of interest rates enters because most assets
have multiple year cash flows and, for reasons relating to risk and time
preferences, the discount rate that applies to distant [cash] flows is not
the same as the rate that applies to [cash] flows in the near future. 
7
Regardless of the rationale expressed by Roll and Ross, it is clear
that determining the entire set of systematic risk factors having perva-
sive influence over the returns to assets is inherently speculative and
ultimately cannot be conclusive. In fact, it has become fairly common
to use the returns to a market index such as the S&P 500 Index as an
additional systematic risk factor in an attempt to explain residual risk.
The rationale for this practice is the belief that "[a] ny missing factor
is embodied in this residual market factor in exactly the same manner
that all factors are embodied in the market return for the market
model or the CAPM."O8 However, the difficulty of not knowing pre-
cisely the identity of the systematic risk factors does not prevent the
empirical application of the APT. Indeed, the ambiguity present in
the APT seems slight when compared to the task of identifying the
mean-variance efficient market portfolio prescribed by the CAPM.
C. Application of the APT to the Measurement of Damages
Measurement of damages in a Rule 10b-5 case by means of a
multi-factor model is analogous to the procedure detailed in the Sec-
tion regarding the market model. First, regression of the security's
returns against the identified systematic risk factors for the period
106 The concept of discounted cash flow may be expressed as follows:
Pt= E, [D(t+k)/(1 +d+'J,
A-0
where P is the price of the asset at time t, E, expresses expectations at time t, D(t+k) is
the cash flow available at time t+k, and d is the discount rate.
107 Roll & Ross, supra note 93, at 19.
10s Berry et al., supra note 94, at 31.
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preceding the misrepresentation is performed. Second, the values of
the systematic risk factors during the period of the misrepresentation
are determined. Third, the estimated return of the security is calcu-
lated for the period of the misrepresentation. This estimate is de-.
rived by plugging into the multiple regression equation, which now
expresses the security's risk coefficients for each systematic risk factor,
the values of the unanticipated changes of the systematic risk factors.
Fourth, the implied price or true value of the security for the date of
plaintiff's transaction is calculated using the estimated return calcu-
lated in step three. Finally, the difference between the price of the
security on the date of the plaintiffs transaction and the implied
price represents the measure of damages per unit of the security, pro-
vided this difference is positive. As was the case in the example of
calculating damages with the market model, the value line of a secu-
rity as calculated with a multi-factor model is the set of implied prices
calculated for each subperiod of the period of fraudulent conduct.
Any discussion proposing multi-factor models as an alternative to
the market model for the purposes of measuring damages in a Rule
10b-5 case is incomplete without consideration of at least one empiri-
cal test that compares the multi-factor models and the single-factor
market model. Therefore, the following Part summarizes the results
of two different empirical studies and identifies insights regarding the
implications for damages measurement.
V. MULTI-FACTOR AND SINGLE-FACTOR MODELS: A HORSE RACE
Throughout this Article, we have suggested that neither the
CAPM nor the market model is adequate for measuring Rule 10b-5
damages. In this Part, we compare the explanatory power of single-
factor models such as the CAPM and the market model with multi-
factor models such as the APT. We summarize the results of two stud-
ies: the first compares the ex ante predictive power of the CAPM and
the APT; the second compares the ex post explanatory power of the
market model and a multi-factor model. While the former study is
suggestive in favoring multi-factor models, it still focuses on finance
applications of asset-pricing models, rather than on legal applications
of asset-pricing models. This focus arises because the first study is
concerned with ex ante prediction rather than ex post explanation.
The second study directly addresses the question of which kind of
model is more appropriate for measuring 10b-5 damages and shows
that, at least in the sample considered, a multi-factor model is far su-
perior to the market model.
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In an important study, Bower, Bower and Logue estimated the re-
lationship of risk and return for electric utilities and natural gas utili-
ties by means of the CAPM and the APT.'O" They concluded that
"APT does do better than CAPM in explaining and conditionally
forecasting return variations through time and across assets," and that
it "would be wise to give APT greater weight [than the CAPM] in de-
cisions."" Their conclusion rests on their findings that the APT not
only better explains the variance of returns than does the CAPM, but
that it also produces better out-of-sample forecasts of expected re-
turns. This foundation is particularly noteworthy in connection with
the measurement of damages in Rule lOb-5 cases. From our previous
discussion, recall that the calculation of the expected return is the
principle objective of measuring damages in a Rule 10b-5 case. From
the estimated expected return, the true value or implied price of the
security for the date of a plaintiff's transaction may be determined.
The difference between the true value and a plaintiffs transaction
price, if positive, is the per share measure of damages.
The evidence presented by Bower et al. was constructed using
monthly returns for 942 stocks and four Treasury security portfolios
from 1971 through 1979."' All of the stocks were listed on either the
New York or the American Stock Exchanges and traded continuously
from 1963 through 1980.12 The stocks were divided into a total of
thirty portfolios-eighteen portfolios contained thirty-one stocks and
twelve contained thirty-two stocks."13 Bower et al. note that portfolios
were used to reduce the "noisiness" of the data present in individual
stocks return data. All companies within an industry group were
placed together in separate portfolios, except in the case of very large
industry groups. ' 15 Most portfolios, however, comprised more than
one industry because most of the industry groups comprised fewer
than thirty-one companies. Of the 942 stocks selected, 127 were ex-
cluded from the initial estimates of the APT and CAPM." '6 This hold-
out sample was used to construct four portfolios that were then used
to test the ability of each model to estimate expected returns. The
109 See Bower et al., supra note 95, at 1053.
110 Id.
"' See id at 1045.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 See id
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holdout stocks consisted of seventy-seven electric utilities, twenty-
three natural gas companies, six telecommunications utilities and
twenty-one industrials.'"
7
The market portfolio proxy for the CAPM was the CRSP value-
weighted index-which included the 127 stocks withheld for the out-
of-sample tests of predictive power." 8 To calculate the APT factor
weights, the techniques described by Oldfield and Rogalski and by
Gultekin and Rogalski were used."9 The four factors observed were
chosen on the basis of the earlier findings of Roll and Ross, as pub-
lished in 1980.120
The first item of evidence presented in favor of the APT con-
cerned the ability of the models to explain the variance of returns for
the portfolios constructed of the in-sample stocks. "The R2 for the
APT characteristic line was higher for each of the 30 portfolios and
the average value for R2 was 0.869 for the APT characteristic lines and
0.605 for the CAPM lines." 2 ' Although these statistics support Bower
et al.'s conclusion that the APT better describes the return-generating
process than does the CAPM, the weight of these statistics is dimin-
ished by the fact that the APT factor weights were derived from the
very returns that they purport to explain.
The second item of evidence presented in favor of the APT does
not require the preceding qualification because the variance of re-
turns explained by the APT played no part in estimating the factor
weights.
[F]or the 127 stocks in our holdout sample... [t]he R2 is higher for 102
of the 127 stocks using the APT factors. [In] addition, the explained
variance with APT is significant at the 1 percent level for the 127-stock
holdout sample and for six of seven industry groups when each industry
is considered separately.1
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id. (citing Gregory S. Oldfield & RichardJ. Rogalski, Treasury Bill Factors and
Common Stock Returns, 36J. FIN. 337, 337-50 (1981)); N. Bulent Gultekin & Richard J.
Rogalski, Government Bond Returns, Measurement of Interest Rate Risk, and the Arbitrage Pric-
ing Theory (Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College Work-
ing Paper, 1982).
120 See Bower et al., supra note 95, at 1045 (citing Roll & Ross, supra note 97, at
1073-1103).
121 Id. at 1046.
122 Id-
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To be sure, this evidence is compelling support for the proposition
that the APT offers a better explanation of the return-generating
process than does the CAPM.
The third item of evidence in support of the APT over the CAPM
considered the ability of the models to estimate expected returns.
Evidence from this aspect of the study is particularly relevant to the
measurement of damages. Bower et al. estimated the expected re-
turns for the 127-stock holdout sample for each month of the 1971-
1979 period by applying the APT factor betas and the CAPM betas
calculated for the holdout sample to the APT and CAPM equations
developed exclusive of the 127-stock holdout sample. The power of
the estimates was assessed using an approach suggested by Theil.'2
The Theil measure, V2, uses the sum of squared differences of each
stock's average return for the 1971-1979 period, [R], from its CAPM or
APT forecast of return, [ri], and the sum of the squared differences of
average return for each stock from the average return for all stocks,
[r.).... The smaller the ratio, the better is the model forecast relative
to the naive forecast.1
2 4
The Theil measures for the APT and the CAPM were 0.822 and
1.115, respectively.'2' These scores indicate that not only did the
CAPM fail to better the APT, but it also failed to better the naive es-
timate of expected returns. The naive estimate of expected returns is
expressed in the denominator of the Theil measure, which may be
expressed as follows:1
2
,
n nri? +
i~l i=1
The superiority of APT over CAPM was evident even though the
CRSP value-weighted index, which was used as the market portfolio
proxy for the CAPM, included the 127 stocks comprising the holdout
sample. When Bower et al. included the 127 holdout stocks in the
development of the APT model, the ability of the APT to estimate ex-
pected returns improved significantly. The Rs increased and the un-
explained variance of returns decreased for the APT estimates.
27
Similar improvement was reflected by the Theil measure. The Theil
123 See HENRYTHEIL, APPLIED ECONOMIc FORECASTING (1966).
124 See Bower et al., supra note 95, at 1049-50.
12 See id. at 1050.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 1051.
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measure for the APT estimates of expected return declined from
0.822 to 0.505. Bower et al. note that
[t]he forecast improvement and the distribution of that improvement
across industry groups are consistent with a conclusion that entirely
omitting a class of companies, such as utilities, from the [APT] factor es-
timation process will provide scores that fail to reflect factors to which
[that class of companies] may be particularly responsive. This is a bias
against APT in our holdout tests that makes the holdout findings pre-
sented... even more impressive.
Bower et al. conducted parallel holdout analysis of weekly returns,
and found the results to be substantially similar to that produced
from the monthly data.2n Additional research using daily returns
without a holdout sample demonstrated that the four-factor APT ex-
plained more of the variance of returns than did the CAPM.' ° Unfor-
tunately, Bower et al. presented the particulars of the weekly and the
daily return studies in anecdotal form only.'
3
'
Notwithstanding the significance of the Bower et al. study, it suf-
fers from a serious limitation. The authors erroneously assume that
the factors they estimate for firms that are not in the utilities or tele-
communications industries can be used to estimate what the returns
would have been in the holdout sample. They provide no basis for
this assumption. To the extent there may be industry-specific differ-
ences in the factors themselves, there is absolutely no basis for the
conclusions drawn in the Bower et al. study. While we recognize this
problem, we include the Bower et al. results because it is the most
important existing study that actually tried to implement the APT
model.
A more substantive problem with the Bower et al. study, perhaps,
is that it is really an ex ante rather than an ex post analysis and it is
premised on unobservable factors based on regression residuals,
rather than observable factors such as inflation or interest rates. The
only multi-factor models that will work well for assessing damages un-
der Rule 10b-5 are ex post models that explain asset returns over a
specific time period based on observable economic factors, such as
the difference between long and short term interest rates or the dif-
ference between interest rates on high quality and low quality bonds,
in addition to the overall stock market's return.
128 R
9 See id. at 1052.
ISO See id.
131 See id.
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Exactly this kind of study was recently undertaken by the authors
of this Article.' In that study, the authors utilized a sample of firms
in the electric utility industry and examined the monthly returns for
those stocks over the period from 1964-1989. As in the Bower et al.
study, and almost all other asset-pricing studies, these stocks were ag-
gregated into different portfolios-in this case, ten portfolios in total.
The authors then compared the explanatory power of the market
model with the explanatory power of a multi-factor model which in-
cluded two factors in addition to the market index. The first factor,
the difference between the yields on long term corporate bonds and
long term government bonds, captures the risk premium for corpo-
rate bonds. This factor should become larger as economic conditions
worsen because investors in corporate bonds would require more of a
risk premium to compensate them for possible losses due to bank-
ruptcy. The second additional factor in the Adams et al. multi-factor
model was the difference between the yields on long term govern-
ment bonds and Treasury Bills, which reflects the steepness of the
term structure of interest rates. 3 3 The slope of the term structure of
interest rates is extremely important for financial markets and stock
valuation because an upward-sloping yield curve implicitly predicts
that short term interest rates will be significantly higher in the future
than they are today.3 4 Adams et al. found that for the ten utility stock
portfolios under consideration, the multi-factor model explained al-
most 41% more of the total stock returns across the portfolios over
the sample period than did the market model.115 The Appendix to
this Article shows that in each of the ten portfolios of utility stocks,
both the risk variable and the term structure variable were statistically
significant at the one percent level. These results suggest quite
clearly that the market model is significantly inferior to a multi-factor
model in assessing lOb-5 damages.
The implication for measurement of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases
seems clear: Using the multi-factor model and stock returns for com-
panies in the manipulated security's industry class during the period
132 Edward S. Adams, John W. Krainer & David E. Runkle, Analyzing Stocks in the
Electric Utility Industry (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
133 The term structure of interest rates is simply the relationship between the time
to maturity for government bonds and their yield to maturity.
134 See, e.g., FRANKJ. FABOZZI, BOND MARKETS, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIES 98-100 (3d
ed. 1996).
'3 Adams et al. also examined other factors that had been included in multi-factor
models, such as inflation and industrial production used in Roll & Ross, supra note 93,
at 19.
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of the manipulation can provide additional information that not only
explains the variance of returns at a statistically significant level, but
more importantly, produces better estimates of expected return for
the period of manipulation than can be calculated by the market
model.
While the results of the above-mentioned study are significant, it
is more useful perhaps to demonstrate in concrete terms the superi-
ority of multi-factor models over single-factor models in computing
damages in securities fraud cases. Accordingly, consider the follow-
ing illustration of the superiority of the multi-factor model in the con-
text of a securities fraud class action suit brought against the
Fleet/Norstar Financial Group. '36
In the Fleet/Norstar Financial Group case, the plaintiffs brought
a class action suit against Fleet alleging that in 1989 and 1990 the de-
fendants materially misrepresented the financial condition of Fleet.
The plaintiffs alleged that this misrepresentation inflated the market
price of the corporation's stock. To verify the superiority of our
technique over conventional single-factor methodologies, we esti-
mated the predicted excess returns to Fleet stock during the class pe-
riod using each of the two respective models and compared the pre-
dicted returns from those models. In each case, we used monthly
data from the five years prior to the beginning of the class period to
estimate the parameters of the model for the purpose of determining
the cumulative excess return above the appropriate Treasury Bill re-
turns. Since the class period began in March of 1989, our estimation
period began in March of 1984 and extended through February of
1989.
Prior to proceeding with the analysis, there were a number of
compelling intuitive reasons to believe that the multi-factor model
discussed in this Article would show substantially different estimates
of damages than a single-factor market model. Whereas the market
model seeks to explain all returns to Fleet stock as a function of over-
all stock price movements, for banks, both the term structure of in-
terest rates and the spread between corporate bonds and conven-
tional government bonds may have a significant effect on return to
the stock. When long term interest rates are substantially higher than
short term interest rates, bank profitability is likely to increase be-
cause the relative cost of a given bank's short term deposits will have
declined compared to its returns on lending, at least for fixed rate
136 In reFleet/Norstar Sec. Litig., 935 F. Supp. 99 (D.RI. 1996).
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loans. This increase in profitability should increase the value of bank
stocks even if the overall market does not, in fact, move upward. Cor-
respondingly, if the interest rate spread between long term govern-
ment bonds and long term corporate bonds increases, that increase
may indicate that banks are charging higher interest rates on loans,
thereby increasing bank profits and bank stock returns as well.
As one might expect, the models show substantially different es-
timates for what the return to Fleet stock would have been without
any fraud. The market model predicts that from the beginning of
March of 1989 through the end of March of 1990, the return on Fleet
stock would have been 16.64%. However, results from our three-
factor model predict that the returns over that period would have
been only 12.88%, given the actual stock market return term struc-
ture premium and risk premium between March of 1989 and March
of 1990.137 The two models' predictions differ by 3.76% over this pe-
riod. Since the single-factor model estimates a higher return for Fleet
stock than the multi-factor model, the estimate of damages from the
single-factor model would be substantially larger than the estimate of
damages from the multi-factor model (because the difference be-
tween the model's predicted return and the actual return of -19.42%
during this period would be larger).'38  Since the value of Fleet's
common stock at the end of February of 1989 was slightly over $2.6
billion, this 3.76% difference in the two models' return represents an
almost $100 million difference in the value of the firm by the end of
the class period.
3 9
This example illustrates the clear superiority of the multi-factor
model compared to a single-factor market model in estimating securi-
ties returns, and hence damages, in securities fraud cases. Impor-
tantly, two caveats are necessary in assessing the new model. First, al-
though the damage estimate in this case would be lower using the
137 This particular model is estimated with monthly data and our resultsjust for illus-
tration, are shown for monthly data. The actual class period for this suit was March 14,
1989 through April 3, 1990. See id. at 102. Obviously, to determine returns for this actual
class period, a different model from the one used here would be necessary. This model is
for illustrative purposes only.
Note that the returns shown here are all excess returns compared to the Treasury
Bill rate rather than actual returns. However, differences between returns would still be
the same.
139 Of course, this $100 million figure is not meant to signify what the damages would
have been in this case. That, of course, would entail additional factors, including esti-
mates of the prices that shares were actually bought and sold at during the relevant class
period.
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multi-factor model than the single-factor model, depending upon cir-
cumstances, damage estimates could be higher in other cases. Sec-
ond, although in this case we used the three-factor model that we
have used throughout this Article, in a particular damage suit, a cus-
tom designed multi-factor model for the particular stock in question
could be still more accurate.
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed model choice for calculating the expected
return to a manipulated security, recognizing that the calculation of
expected return is tantamount to the measurement of damages. We
argued that a multi-factor ex post model was the best way to measure
damages under Rule 10b-5. Ex ante models like the CAPM and the
APT may well be suitable for investment decisions, but they are not
suitable for damage measurement. Therefore, the most important
issue is to determine whether the single-factor market model or a
more general multi-factor model is more accurate in assessing dam-
ages. Only the Adams et al. study addresses this issue, and that study
found that a multi-factor model offers a very significant improvement
over a single-factor market model. Therefore, the measurement of
damages by means of the single-factor market model or even a market
model with an industry index component is likely to be very unreli-
able. Not only are the resulting estimates of damages unreliable, but
the degree of unreliability is not even susceptible to approximation.
While perfect estimation of the effect of general economic condi-
tions on a manipulated security's returns remains the goal in meas-
urement of Rule 10b-5 damages cases, it will probably remain unat-
tainable. The most that one can expect is a reasonable
approximation. In the field of capital market theory, new models of
asset returns are accepted when they can help explain those returns,
and old models are discarded when new models yield further under-
standing. Our results suggest that a multi-factor model is a superior
alternative to the market model and that the multi-factor model,
rather than the market model or any other variant of the CAPM, rep-
resents the best means of measuring damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.
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APPENDIX
This appendix summarizes the empirical results in Adams et al.
4 0
In that paper those authors examined the relative performance of
single- and multi-factor models in explaining the actual returns on
portfolios of electric utility firms ranked by decile. In each case the
dependent variable is the excess realized return for the portfolio of
electric utilities over the Treasury Bill rate on a monthly basis from
the beginning of 1960 through the end of 1994. For the single-factor
model the independent variables were a constant and the return over
the Treasury Bill rate on the value-weighted portfolio of securities on
the New York and American Exchanges. The multi-factor model also
adds a risk variable which is simply the difference between the yield
BAA corporate bonds and the yield on long term Treasury Bonds ad-
justed to be at a monthly rate. A third factor, the steepness of the
term-structure of interest rates, measures the difference between the
yield on long term government bonds and Treasury Bills. Once
again, this is also adjusted to be at a monthly rate. The independent
variables are regressed on the dependent variables. The results of
these regressions are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. Note that for
each portfolio, in the multi-factor model the term structure and risk
variables are significant at the 0.01 level. The tables show the coeffi-
cient estimates for the variables in each model and denote the level of
statistical significance for each coefficient.
TABLE 1: SINGLE-FACTOR MODEL
Portfolio Constant Market
1 0.0009 0.5544*
2 0.0027 0.5467*
3 0.0018 0.5201*
4 0.0023 0.5443*
5 0.0025 0.6162*
6 0.0021 0.6200*
7 0.0015 0.5971*
8 0.0010 0.5733*
9 0.0009 0.6275*
10 0.0010 0.6050*
*" Coefficient significant at the 0.05 level
**" Coefficient significant at the 0.01 level
140 See supra note 132.
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TABLE 2: MULTI-FACTOR MODEL
Pnrtfnl~n M~rlk~t Pdt Tprrn- trllwtnrp
1 0.0008 0.4444** 0.7466** 0.4824**
2 0.0026 0.4124** 0.6256** 0.6006**
3 0.0017 0.3747** 0.6756** 0.6504**
4 0.0022 0.3974** 0.5854** 0.6606**
5 0.0024 0.4752** 0.6340** 0.6315**
6 0.0020 0.4841** 0.5232** 0.6118**
7 0.0014 0.4555** 0.5245** 0.6388**
8 0.0009 0.4204** 0.5233** 0.6912**
9 0.0008 0.4797** 0.6361** 0.6629**
10 0.0009 0.4598** 0.4550** 0.6580**
C.nn t nt

